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Es kann leicht so scheinen, als zeigte jeder Zweifel nur eine 
vorhandene Lücke im Fundament; so dass ein sicheres Verständ-
nis nur dann möglich ist, wenn wir zuerst an allem zweifeln, woran 
gezweifelt werden kann, und dann alle diese Zweifel beheben. 
(TS227, 73: PU §87b) 
1. The Status of Natural Knowledge 
The common cognoscitive form of access to reality (cones-
quently exceptis excipiendis) constitutes, at first sight, a 
definite (constant) and valid (not deficient) contexture.1 
The standardisation of “ideal” knowledge is determined by 
its ineluctable and enough character. The way of being 
that makes up mankind takes root without our interference, 
in a word - naturally. Since we are aware, we accede to 
the world through this perspective, in such a way that it 
does not seem credible to pass to a different situation. The 
patrimony of fundamental or foundational structures that 
shapes “common sense”, which presents itself as legiti-
mate, manifests itself as the source of all derived or 
appendicular knowledge we can hold in our individual exis-
tence, also being, extensively, the positum of the various 
scientific disciplines. 
Nevertheless we recognise, as much as it is possible for 
us to recognise, that we do not know a multiplicity of 
things, but this identification does not leave us perplexed, 
nor projects us to an immediate and complete acquisition 
of what we do not know. By the opposite, the recognition 
of ignorance regarding immense subjects is faced with 
naturalness because we do not need this. A distinct 
problem consists in a fall’s possibility of primary or basic 
determinations. In effect, although habitually we do not 
tend for a perspicuous understanding of these, we could 
not be uninjured if it would produce a deficiency in its 
functioning, seeing that this would constitute a convulsion 
in experience.  
Wittgenstein’s remark that works for motto to the present 
speculation stresses an aspect that allows to call into 
question the solidity of natural empirical conformation, 
namely: “an existing gap in the foundations”. Wittgenstein 
relates further a strategy that passes over all History of 
Western Philosophy: the conception according to which 
“secure understanding is only possible if we first doubt 
everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these 
doubts”. At the beginning we do not find “faults” in 
cognitive configuration, but this does not mean they cannot 
exist, though inconspicuous. The discovery of these 
“gaps”, dependent of an attention to the grounding of 
perspective disposal, motivates a continuous philosophical 
reflection. The efforts that are established to nullify the 
discovered problems constitute the other side of this 
investigation. Thus we are forced to admit that natural 
knowledge, in its foundations, in spite of it offer itself as 
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strong, is armed with a genuine fragility, conducive to an 
“amphiboly of representation”. 
2. The Meaning of Doubt 
In circumscribing ourselves only to the well-known material 
of all Wittgensteinian commentators, we find in the book 
edited under the title Über Gewissheit2, which consists in 
remarks written by Wittgenstein in 1949-51, the more 
concrete consideration of “doubt’s” topic with regard to 
certainty and belief in knowledge’s horizon. In MS172 it is 
initiated, precisely, the commentary to the position of 
Moore expressed in “A Defence of Common Sense” 
(1925), “Proof of an External World” (1939) and “Certainty” 
(1941), which serves as a platform to Wittgenstein’s 
circumspection that finishes in MS177, the last lines he 
wrote. (Cf. ÜG, “Vorwort” [Anscombe, von Wright]; cf. also 
Stroll 1994, 8-10; see in addition Malcolm 2001, 70-75) 
Considering the examples of Moore, or others, we verify, 
however absurd, we cannot exclude such possibilities (e.g. 
the earth has started to exist now). In fact the problem lies 
in the argumentation provided by individuation. In other 
words if a doubt is installed promoting a perplexity 
concerning fields of experience, in all its multiple diffusion, 
even its totality, determined, for instance, in its modal 
angle, what is evidenced is a radical lability, proportionate 
by the individual’s representative indecisiveness. This 
makes impracticable a decision, in so far as any delibera-
tion has the problematic form of this point of view. This 
ambiguity of perspective does not result, therefore, in an 
empirical metamorphosis, i.e. in the deposition in a new 
region of event, but in the acknowledgement of paradoxi-
cal quality of experience.3  
In this direction what Wittgenstein carries out is a research 
of the grammar that grounds our access. He says: 
Die Frage des Idealisten wäre etwa so: “Mit welchem 
Recht zweifle ich nicht an der Existenz meiner Hände?” 
(Und darauf kann die Antwort nicht sein: “Ich weiss, 
dass sie existieren”) Wer aber so fragt, der übersieht, 
dass /dass der Zweifel an einer Existenz (nur) in einem 
Sprachspiel seinen Platz hat./ Dass man also erst fragen 
müsse: Wie sähe so ein Zweifel aus? und es nicht so 
ohne weiteres versteht. (MS172, 8: ÜG §24) 
Wittgenstein’s critique to Moore depends, rightfully, on 
analysis of verbs like “to know” (wissen) or “to believe” 
(glauben). In MS174 we verify that the use of “I know” is 
incorrect when applied to phenomena like those at stake. 
When Moore says he “knows” this or that what he is 
referring to is not a particular and, much less, apodictic 
knowledge. Indeed what Moore “knows” is something that 
all we know; however it cannot be proved, demonstrating 
the double misleading employment of verb “to know”. 
Wittgenstein writes:  
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Die /Wahrheiten,/ von denen Moore sagt, er wisse sie, 
sind solche, die, beiläufig gesprochen, wir Alle wissen, 
wenn er sie weiss. (MS174, 22v: ÜG §100) 
Effectively Wittgenstein calls our attention for the “system” 
(System) of “convictions” (Überzeugungen) (cf. MS174, 
22v: ÜG §102), advising that this net of presupposed 
ideas, this synthesis of general cognition, determines, at 
the most, the daily practice. It is “action” (Handlung) that 
must decide relatively to something subjected to doubt. 
This resolution cannot demand “certainty” (Sicherheit, 
Gewissheit) because an asseveration of this nature is 
impossible for us. Wittgenstein’s proposal is based on a 
reductio ad absurdum, which has as a positive limit the 
norm of the “language-game”. Wittgenstein refers:  
Wer an allem zweifeln wollte, der würde auch nicht bis 
zum Zweifel kommen. Das Spiel des Zweifelns selbst 
setzt schon die Gewissheit voraus. (MS174, 25v: ÜG 
§115) 
Empirical operations lay in a “practical harmony” (prak-
tische Harmonie: Hofmann 2000, 255), to such an extent 
that a doubting movement can hardly eliminate in integrum 
the basic “presuppositions” (Voraussetzungen) or “precon-
ceptions” (Vorurteile). Usually it always exists something 
that stands, a “substratum” (Substrat) (cf. MS174, 35r: ÜG 
§162) in which we still are located and that authorises us 
to think, in limine the “meaning” of the words we use. Witt-
genstein states exactly: 
Wenn ich also zweifle, oder unsicher bin darüber, dass 
das meine Hand ist (in welchem Sinn immer), warum 
dann nicht auch /über die/ Bedeutung dieser Worte? 
(MS176, 30r: ÜG §456) 
Thus the set of foundational knowledge we possess shall 
pass to be identified not as something that we “know”, but 
as something that we “believe” and that we should want “to 
believe”. Wittgenstein says: 
Das ich weiss, das glaube ich. (MS174, 37v: ÜG §177) 
It is the reduction of “objective certainty” (objektive 
Gewissheit) to “subjective certainty” (subjektive Gewis-
sheit) (cf. MS175, 1r-1v: ÜG §194) that mould up Wittgen-
stein’s resolubility, mobilising a rotation from an apparent 
“knowing” to a clarified “belief”. This epistemological belief 
should not be immediately confused with Wittgenstein’s 
religious belief. Firstly, this “new method of philosophising” 
(see MS105, 46: WA1, 177, §1) does not impose as an 
indispensable condition this feature, and secondly, for 
Wittgenstein, decidedly, religiousness ought not to con-
stitute simply a theoretical salvation, notwithstanding what 
is in cause is the sustenance of the very praxis. 
In this way Wittgenstein’s depurations have an identical 
practical result to the ones of Moore, but they involve an 
efficient, irrefutable intellection. The “therapeutic methodo-
logy” does not make an apology of “common sense” 
because this is incongruous in Philosophy. On the con-
trary, it diagnoses instability that unnoticeably is inherent 
to natural disposal, which can be raised in all its amplitude 
on the occasion of a philosophical examination like that we 
have debated, showing likewise the nonsense of this 
speculative intention, attempting to safeguard a nature. 
The following remark of Wittgenstein is elucidative: 
Es ist immer von Gnaden der Natur, wenn man etwas 
weiss. (MS176, 42r: ÜG §505) 
Even on the last day, when he wrote down his thoughts, 
he asks: 
‘Wenn ich /dieser/ Evidenz nicht traue, warum soll ich 
dann irgend einer Evidenz trauen?’ (MS177, 10r: ÜG 
§672) 
3. Grammar and Indeterminability 
Wittgenstein’s “grammatical investigations”, although they 
give a resolution for actional epoché, they are permeable 
to a placing in a sphere of indetermination that suggests 
an unsuitability to experience. Really we cannot avoid the 
bewilderment imposed by problems like the ones we have 
submitted to analytical focus (had they been originated 
voluntarily [philosophically] or involuntarily). What we 
experience in these dubious situations is a lack of power to 
decide categorically the aporia; or else, it lacks truth’s 
criterion. Wittgenstein’s solution, which seems to be the 
only possible, depends nevertheless on a progressive 
degradation of pathological intensity that happens per se. 
That is to say, difficult philosophical problems exist, they 
are passable to formulation, and no matter how much, as 
philosophers, we prevent ourselves from the fall into the 
“blind alley” (Sackgassen) of our language, they can 
present and melt away themselves by themselves, 
innately. If on the one hand the philosopher can be 
prepared to face these events, on the other hand he 
cannot help feeling an impotence to determine the 
condition we are in. This is dominated by “truth”, in the 
words of Nietzsche, being preferable for us, according to 
him, a projection of “error”, of “illusion”, instead of an 
unfastening to our “will to truth” (Wille zur Wahrheit). In 
Nietzschean thought that is called to expression by “will to 
power” (Wille zur Macht). In this manner Wittgenstein’s 
position would not escape to what is criticised in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy from the beginning, so to speak 
from the criticism on Schopenhauer, as “resignationism”.  
Notwithstanding, Wittgenstein is the philosopher in all 
“resignational tradition” who better hold his ground. As a 
matter of fact he gives us the elements so that we could 
theoretically consolidate a community, developing a 
“truth’s process of publicity” (Wahrheitsprozess der 
Öffentlichkeit: Hofmann 2000, 262). But furthermore 
Wittgenstein’s indagation is guided ab initio (i.e. since the 
mystical remarks of Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung 
and of correspondent notebooks [MSS101-103]) by an 
ethical purpose: a continuous suitability to original request 
and a making known to the others what he saw.  
For that reason an extension to exegetical views of 
authors like Stroll or Hofmann is feasible. The former, 
despite the conceptual distinction established between 
“epistemic” plan of “knowledge” and “non-epistemic” plan 
of “certainty” or “certitude”, defending this last one as the 
corner stone of Wittgenstein’s “foundationalism”, restricts, 
as a consequence, his “analytical” ratiocination to 
epistemological range (cf. Stroll 1994, 145, 161). The later, 
a “continental” author, situates herself epistemologically 
too, concretely in a Kantian Metaphysik der Sitten (cf. 
Hofmann 2000, 137, 163). But it becomes clear along the 
Nachlass another dimension of Wittgenstein’s philosophi-
cal task. He writes, for example, in ‘Band IV, Philoso-
phische Bemerkungen’ from 1929-30: 
Die Ergebnisse der Philosophie sind die Entdeckung 
irgend eines schlichten Unsinns und Beulen die sich der 
Verstand beim Anrennen an /das Ende/ der Sprache 
geholt hat. Sie, die Beulen, lassen uns der Wert jener 
Entdeckung /erkennen/. (MS108, 247: WA2, 302, §4) 
This confrontation with “/the end/ of language” shall be 
ethically interpreted (cf. DB, “Vorwort” [Somavilla]). 
Wittgenstein’s inquiry institutes a return to a ground we 




must preserve as the directrix of our access to things. In 
doing this it constitutes a tension between an antisceptical 
philosophical perspective and an “insight” (Einsicht) that 
extravasates Philosophy (metaphilosophically), which is in 
the antipodes of the Nietzschean proposal and that is 
defined as a search for sense in a relation of love.  
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